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ABSTRACT
Many states are under court-order to reduce local disparities in education spending. While a
substantial body of literature suggests that these orders and the resulting school finance equalizations
have increased the level and progressivity of state education spending, there is little evidence on the
broader effects of such measures on the change in total resources available not only for schools, but
for other local government programs as well. When states spend more on education, both state and
local budget constraints change. We find that while mandated school finance equalizations increase
both the level and progressivity of state spending on education, states finance the required increase
in education spending in part by reducing their aid to localities for other programs. Local
governments, in turn, respond to the increases in state taxation and spending by reducing both their
own revenue-raising and their own spending on education and on other programs. Thus, while state
education aid does increase total spending on education, it does so at the expense of drawing
resources away from spending on programs like public welfare, highways, and hospitals. These
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Beginning with California’s landmark Serrano v. Priest case in 1971, states have moved 
towards increasingly redistributive school finance policies, with 22 states since having been 
ordered by their Supreme Courts to redistribute funds towards lower-income school districts.  
The main documented effect of these equalizations has been to increase the level and 
progressivity of state spending on schools. When states spend more on education, that changes 
both state and local budget constraints, and thus may affect many different spending and revenue 
decisions. States allocate funds to localities for many different programs, so mandated increases 
in state spending on education could result in offsetting reductions in funds provided to localities 
for other programs.  Similarly, localities might react to these changes by changing their own 
revenue and spending decisions.  The net effect of increased state spending on education on the 
total resources available to localities and spending on public goods may thus be quite different 
from the gross change in state education budgets.  Given that localities receive thirty percent of 
their total revenues in the form of state intergovernmental grants, about 60 percent of which is 
earmarked for education, changes to this stream of funding are likely to have substantial effects 
on other aspects of state and local budgets.  This is thus a particularly fertile area through which 
to explore the broader issues of the effectiveness of redistribution through earmarked funds and 
intergovernmental spillovers in the provision of public goods. 
While a substantial body of research has documented that these state school finance 
equalization measures have increased both state spending on education and school budgets in 
low-income districts (but sometimes also reduced budgets in high-income districts), little 
attention has been paid to the potential offsetting reactions of state and local governments.  Do 
states and localities act to negate any net change in mandated state education spending?  Do   2 
school finance equalization measures increase the total resources available to low-income 
districts, or do they merely restrict the mix of grants they receive?  Does total spending on public 
goods increase?  What is the ultimate incidence of the mandate?   
We examine the effect of mandated increases in state education spending on the 
distribution of public spending on a variety of programs – both education and non-education.   
We begin with an analysis of the impact of school finance equalizations (SFEs) on the level and 
progressivity of state intergovernmental aid to localities for education and for other program 
areas.  Next, we analyze data at the local level to examine:  (1) how states reallocate non-
education funds in response to mandated increases in education spending; (2) how local 
governments respond to changes in state education aid through their own revenue-raising 
behavior; and (3) how changes in state education aid affect local spending on education and 
other programs.  We explore the factors that drive heterogeneity of local responses, including 
demographics, economic conditions, and political and legislative constraints.  This approach 
allows us to consider the average and distributional consequences of increases in state education 
spending across different programs and different localities.   
  We use data on school finance equalizations and state and local revenues and 
expenditures in the 1980s and 1990s to explore these spillover effects.  We find that both states 
and localities react to offset some of the changes in mandated state education spending.  We find 
that mandated school finance equalizations do increase both the level and progressivity of state 
spending on education, but that states finance the required increase in education spending in part 
by reducing their aid to localities for other programs.  While localities do get more money from 
the state for education after a court-ordered school finance equalization, for every dollar of 
increased state education aid they lose about 20 cents of state aid for other programs.  Local   3 
governments respond to the increases in state taxation and spending by reducing their own 
revenue-raising, their own spending on education (thus blunting the effect of the increases in 
state education spending), and their spending on other programs.   
Thus, while state education aid increases total spending on education, it does so at the 
expense of drawing resources away from spending on programs like public welfare, highways, 
and hospitals.  Understanding these spillover effects is critical not only for understanding the full 
incidence of the mandated increases in state education aid, but also more broadly for evaluating 
the effectiveness of using earmarked funds to achieve redistribution.  The effectiveness of 
redistribution through specific programs is limited by the ability of intervening levels of 
government to undo that redistribution and to redirect funds for other purposes, thus affecting the 
level, composition, and distribution of public spending. 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON SCHOOL SPENDING AND SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATIONS 
Our central question is how state education aid to local school districts affects the total 
resources available to school districts and other local governments, and how much those local 
governments spend on programs, both education and non-education.  Court-ordered school 
finance equalizations, in addition to being widely utilized policy instruments of independent 
interest, provide us with a source of externally-imposed variation in how states transfer funds to 
local school districts.  Such variation is critical to identifying how receiving more or less state 
education aid affects other state aid received, local revenue generated, and levels of education 
and non-education program expenditures.  For example, poorer areas within a state may (1) 
receive more education aid, (2) receive more state aid through other income-based progressive 
programs, and (3) raise less revenue themselves through income taxes – all because they have   4 
lower per capita income, not because any one causes the others.  In order to abstract from these 
correlations (due to unobserved time-varying local conditions such as unmeasured income) and 
uncover a causal relationship, we need to use a source of exogenous variation in the amount of 
state education aid each locality receives.  Previous research suggests that court-ordered school 
finance equalizations provide just such a shock to state education grants to school districts.   
School finance equalization (SFE) measures have been adopted by many states 
voluntarily as well as under court order as a means to increase the resources available to students 
in poor school districts.  States exhibit wide variation in the structure and details of their SFEs, 
and empirical and theoretical work has shown that these different ways of distributing state 
revenue to districts have significantly different effects on local responses and thus on school 
spending at the district level (see Downes and Shah (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1999), and 
Hoxby (2001)).  We categorize SFEs following the work of Card and Payne (2002), updating 
information on SFEs after 1992 with information from Corcoran et al. (2003).  In our analysis, 
we focus on SFEs in which state supreme courts ruled school financing systems unconstitutional 
and mandated reforms to the systems, consistent with Card and Payne’s finding that that such 
court-ordered SFEs have the strongest effects on the distribution of state education revenue.  We 
exclude court cases in which school finance systems were not overturned and instances in which 
state legislatures undertook SFE reforms of their own initiative, without judicial intervention (as 
these are more likely to be endogenously driven).   
Our empirical strategy thus relies on the relatively exogenous nature of SFEs.   While the 
literature on SFEs has centered far more on the effects of SFEs (discussed below) than on the 
circumstances which generate them, the existing evidence on whether pre-existing state 
conditions drive the timing of court orders suggests that court orders are largely independent of   5 
these conditions.  Card and Payne explore the relationship between the progressivity of state 
education aid in 1977 and subsequent court-ordered school finance equalization.
1  T h e  
progressivity of state education aid (measured by the effect of local income on state aid) looks 
strikingly similar for states that experienced (successful or unsuccessful) school finance litigation 
and those that did not:  In states that ultimately received court orders between 1977 and 1992, 
school districts received $1.37 less (s.e. 0.21) in state aid per pupil for each additional $1000 of 
median family income in the district in 1977;  in states where court decisions upheld existing 
school finance systems, districts received $1.28 less (s.e. 0.11); and in states where no court 
decisions were issued by 1992, districts received $1.08 less (s.e. 0.42).  These results suggest that 
court-ordered SFEs did not result from systematically different pre-existing levels of 
progressivity in state aid.   
Another piece of evidence supporting the exogenous nature of court-orders comes from 
the work of Figlio, Husted, and Kenny (2004).  Their paper is an investigation of the contributors 
to within-state inequality in education revenue, rather than an examination of what causes SFEs, 
but they create a classification of state constitutional language that is useful for both purposes.
2  
They classify state constitutions along two dimensions:  the strength of language supporting 
equity in education and the strength of language supporting adequacy in education.  This 
language categorization (like Card and Payne’s initial progressivity measure) appears 
uncorrelated with later SFE passage.
3   
                                                 
1 In Table 3 of their paper they estimate the effect of median family income in a school district on the state education 
aid it received.  States distribute general education aid to school districts based largely on property wealth of the 
district, not income, and distribute aid for categorical programs based on eligible student counts by program area 
(for example, special education or bilingual education).  The point of the Card and Payne approach is not to replicate 
the mechanism by which states distributed aid, but to characterize the ultimate incidence of that aid by district 
income level. 
2 Note that their classification has considerable but not complete overlap with that of McUsic (1991). 
3 These classifications are shown in Appendix Table 1.   6 
There is a large body of research (that we touch on only briefly here) that explores how 
SFEs have met their main goals of changing the amount and distribution of education spending  
– and, ultimately, changing the distribution of student outcomes.  The primary finding from this 
literature is that SFEs do in fact change the amount of state aid to school districts sufficiently to 
alter both the distribution and mean level of local education spending.  This results from changes 
in how states distribute aid, as well as in the amount states spend on education overall.  Murray, 
Evans, and Schwab (1998) find that court-ordered SFE schemes reduced inequality in local 
education spending within states by up to one-third between 1972 and 1992.  Card and Payne 
find that court-ordered SFEs increased the progressivity of state education aid to school districts 
from 1977 to 1992.  In looking at a particularly severe SFE, Fischel (1989) finds that California’s 
Serrano decision equalizing school spending led to the property tax limitation of Proposition 13 
and subsequently to declines in spending on education.     
Several recent papers (taking SFEs as exogenous) explore the ultimate impact of these 
SFE-induced changes in school spending on student outcomes.  Card and Payne (2002) find that 
SFEs narrow the distribution of education spending, and correspondingly narrow the distribution 
of SAT scores.  Hoxby (2001), considering the income and price effects of SFEs on a case-by-
case basis, finds that some types of SFEs may reduce dropout rates for schools with the lowest 
spending prior to the SFE, while other types may increase private school attendance for districts 
facing extremely high marginal tax prices after the reform.  Clark (2003) finds that while 
Kentucky’s Education Reform Act did have a significant equalizing effect on school spending, it 
did not have an equalizing effect on student achievement.  Our analysis of the spillover effect of 
changes in education spending may affect the interpretation of these findings: if increases in   7 
school spending were offset by decreases in other spending, those offsetting reductions could 
undermine gains in achievement that might otherwise be seen.   
Little existing research has focused directly on the potential spillovers from SFEs to other 
parts of local budgets, although there is some indirect evidence.  Cullen and Loeb (2001) look at 
how school districts in Michigan newly-constrained to increase their current education spending 
beyond their desired level of spending manipulate the categorization of their expenditures.  For 
example, districts may have moved maintenance spending from capital to current accounts, 
allowing them to use SFE dollars for it.  Gordon (2004) finds no significant total impact of 
federal compensatory education grants on instructional spending (the category of spending 
mandated by the grants) because of off-setting changes in state and local behavior.  There is also 
some evidence on the effects that other narrow mandates have on total spending (both within and 
between jurisdictions) from outside the education literature.  Baicker (2001) finds that states 
finance mandated increases in Medicaid spending primarily by cutting back on other public 
welfare spending that serves the same low-income population.   There is also ample evidence of 
spillovers between jurisdictions – when one area spends more, neighboring areas adjust by 
spending more as well (see Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993, and Baicker, 2004, for example).   
Together, this literature suggests that examining the effect of mandated changes in 
education spending on education budgets alone would paint an incomplete picture of their 
distributional consequences.  We examine the broader effects of mandated changes in education 
spending on the total resources available to local jurisdictions. 
   8 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY   
  We wish to examine the effect of changes in state educational grants on the total 
resources available to and spent by different localities.  We break down this question into three 
parts.
4  First, we ask how school finance equalizations (SFEs) change state spending and 
revenue. We examine aggregate state spending before and after SFE orders to verify that they 
actually increase state spending on education, and also explore the predictability of court-ordered  
SFEs.  Second, we ask how SFEs change the progressivity of state spending, not only on 
education but on all other programs.  We examine the relationship between a locality’s income 
and the net revenue it receives from the state before and after SFEs.  This question merits 
attention independently, but also provides an avenue to answer another set of questions.  We ask, 
third, how (exogenous) changes in state spending on education affect localities’ revenues from 
other sources and expenditures on other programs.  We examine both the level and distributional 
effects of state education spending on local revenues and expenditures using SFEs to abstract 
from confounding changes in demographics and economic conditions.  We also explore the 
demographic, economic, and political factors driving heterogeneous responses to changes in state 
education spending.  In this section we detail our empirical strategy for answering these 
questions, and in the next section we describe our data. 
 
                                                 
4 While we do not build a formal model of voter and legislature behavior here, our implicit framework is 
straightforward and similar in flavor to that of Baron and Ferejohn (1987 and 1989).  The legislature makes 
allocative decisions which reflect the preferences of voters in the represented districts and the strategic behavior of 
representatives seeking re-election, given agenda-setting rules governing the legislative body.  When the court 
mandates a school finance equalization, the basic intuition is that the legislature is no longer free to distribute 
education resources as they wish (they are now constrained in how they do this by the judicial mandate), so the 
distribution of funds designated for other purposes may change as well in order to return the distribution of net 
resources to an equilibrium state.     9 
School Finance Equalizations and State Spending  
  Following previous research, we begin with a simple analysis of the responses of 
aggregate state spending and revenue collection by estimating a regression of the following 
form: 
  st st st t s st SFE X enditure exp or revenue ε δ β α + + Γ + + =   (1) 
where the dependent variable is a state revenue or expenditure category, in real per capita terms, 
s indexes the state, and t indexes time.  We control for state and year fixed effects and state-level 
demographic characteristics (such as population, income, unemployment, and racial 
composition), and define SFE as a dummy variable equal to one if the state has had a court-order 
ruling its education finance system unconstitutional prior to that year.  We begin with the 
aggregate state responses as a starting point for the broader distributional analysis.  We need to 
know how states’ spending and revenue are affected by SFEs:  knowing that states increase 
education spending and property tax revenue collection following SFEs, for example, suggests 
potential responses in both local spending and revenue raising.  δ shows the effect of the SFE on 
the average aggregate per capita state budget item.   
  We also use state-level data to explore the predictability of SFEs.   We estimate: 
  st s st t st Language onal Constituti X SFE ε β + Λ + Γ + =   (2) 
where “constitutional language” is a vector of the state constitution provisions for adequacy and 
equity of education developed by Figlio et al. and described above and Xst is a vector of time-
varying state demographic characteristics.   
   10 
The Distribution of State Education and Non-education Intergovernmental Grants 
Card and Payne demonstrate that SFEs make state spending on education more 
progressive, but we would like to know if there are offsetting changes in the progressivity of 
other state grants to localities.
5  Adapting Card and Payne’s methodology, we next characterize a 
school finance regime’s progressivity by the extent to which a locality’s per capita state 
education revenue is negatively correlated with its median family income.  We then analyze the 
extent to which states operating under court-ordered school finance equalizations change the 
progressivity of their distribution of education aid and non-education aid to localities.  We thus 
estimate: 
 
it i st st
it it t i it
income fam relative SFE SFE









                        (3) 
where i indexes the county-level observation, t indexes time, and X is a vector of time-varying 
county-level demographics (including population, employment rates, racial composition, and 
urbanicity).  While local median family income is time-varying, relative family income is 
measured in standard deviations from the state-year average in 1982 (and is therefore constant 
for a given county over time). SFE indicates that i’s state has received a court-order to equalize 
school spending at any time before the current year.   3 δ  thus tells us the change in progressivity 
of state grants to localities under the post-SFE regime. 
 
Changes in Local Spending and Revenues 
Finally, we want to know the effect of exogenous changes in state education expenditures 
on other categories of local spending and revenue-raising.  We estimate: 
                                                 
5 Another avenue through which states might respond is changing the progressivity of non-intergovernmental 
spending and revenues – such as the progressivity of income taxes or the size of low-income assistance programs.  
We will explore these mechanisms in future research.   11 
  it it it t i it state from revenue educ X enditure exp or revenue ε δ β α + + Γ + + =   (4) 
 
where the dependent variable is local revenue from various sources (including that raised locally 
and that received through intergovernmental transfers) and expenditure on different programs 
(including education and non-education).  i indexes counties (including, as discussed below, all 
sub-units of government contained within a county, such as school districts and towns), s indexes 
states, and t indexes time.  Demographic covariates X again include county-area population, 
employment/population ratio, median family income (changing over time), percent black, 
percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban.  
  Clearly if we were to estimate this regression via least squares, the coefficient δ would 
capture not only state reactions to being forced to increase education grants, but also underlying 
economic conditions, the state’s overall propensity to redistribute, demographic conditions, etc. – 
not a causal connection between how much aid the state gives a locality for education and how 
much the state gives that area for other programs or how much the locality spends.  Wealthy 
areas will be eligible for fewer categorical funds for poverty programs, for example, and will 
also receive fewer state education dollars per pupil if the state school finance system is 
progressive.  This does not imply that receiving lower amounts of education aid causes them to 
receive less revenue targeted for public welfare programs from the state.  While we control for 
many demographic variables (and county and time fixed effects), we still do not have access to 
the full set of administrative data used in allocating categorical grants, nor to all data likely to 
influence local demand for public goods.   
  In order to find out whether changes in state education revenue are offset by changes in 
other state aid and how such changes affect local spending and revenue choices, we need to use 
an exogenous source of variation in school spending.  Fortunately, as previous literature suggests   12 
and as we demonstrate below, the school finance equalization measures discussed above provide 
just such a source of variation.  By focusing on the change in state education revenue to local 
areas that is mandated by the imposition of a court-ordered SFE, we can see if a shock to 
education revenue is offset by changes in other resources available to the area, and how it affects 
local spending decisions.   
  We implement this strategy via two-stage least squares instrumental variables estimation, 
and later show that the results are robust under several alternate specifications.   The first stage 
isolates the exogenous portion of changes in state education revenue received by county areas by 
estimating state aid to localities based on local demographics X, county and time fixed effects, 
and whether a court-ordered SFE is in place.  Our first stage is thus:   
  it st it t i it SFE X state from rev educ ε δ β α + + Γ + + = 1   (5) 
We then estimate equation (4) via two-stage least squares, using the predicted education revenue 
from the state from equation (5). 
 
Heterogeneity of Responses 
  Localities may respond differently to these changes, however, based on factors such as 
demographics, legal environment, or income.  We begin by examining whether high- and low-
income districts respond differently.  We expect heterogeneity of response by income-level to the 
extent that median income is correlated with demand for education spending and with the 
heterogeneous effects of SFEs within states.
6 We include the interaction of relative family 
income (again, measured in standard deviations from the state-year average in 1982) with state 
education grants: 
                                                 
6 While we treat SFEs uniformly within states, their effects are actually heterogeneous:   as Hoxby shows, the 
marginal “tax price” of raising local revenue for school spending can vary as much within states as between them.  
This within-state heterogeneity typically is based on the property wealth of the district, not median income.       13 
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  (6) 
Here we use the SFE variable and its interaction with relative income (similar to equation (3)) as 
instruments in the two first stages.  (Note that relative income is not included as a control apart 
from the interaction because it is fixed over time and is therefore captured by the county-area 
fixed effect.  Median income, changing over time, is included as a covariate in X.)   We then 
allow income to affect responses asymmetrically (still continuously), including relative income 
for those counties above the state mean and below the mean separately: 
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  (7) 
These specifications allow us to examine more fully the role that income has on the 
heterogeneity of local responses to changes in state spending on education. 
  There are other dimensions along which local responses may vary systematically.  We 
include analysis of the effects of six other factors (tax and expenditure limits, home ownership, 
the size of local government relative to state government, poverty rates, dependent versus 
independent school district structure, and the black population share) on the responses of 
localities.  The presence of tax and expenditure limits may constrain the choices available to 
states and local jurisdictions.  Home ownership rates may affect the distribution of costs and 
benefits of different tax and expenditure bundles as the quality of local public goods is 
capitalized into home prices.  Localities in states where local government plays a larger role 
relative to state government may have differential ability to offset changes in state behavior.     14 
Funds in school districts that rely on a parent local jurisdiction for funding may be more 
susceptible to redirection.  We allow the effect of mandated changes in state education revenues 
to vary based on each of these factors in turn. 
 
IV.   D ATA 
  The goal of this analysis is to determine the effect of mandated changes in school 
spending on the total revenues available to local governments, the composition of those 
revenues, and how those revenues are allocated across expenditure programs.  If states become 
constrained in how they distribute education aid to school districts, does this affect how the level 
and progressivity of their spending on all programs?  How do localities change their spending 
and revenues in response to these changes?  How does local income affect these responses?  We 
thus need data on state local revenue and expenditures on different categories, the presence of a 
court-ordered SFE, and controls for local demographics and economic conditions.   
 
The County-area Unit of Observation 
  School districts are distinct governmental units, and state education aid typically flows 
directly to them rather than through other local governments.
7  Because school districts by 
definition spend only on education, we must look to the local governments with which they are 
geographically coterminous if we wish to identify the effects of SFEs on revenues and 
expenditures not related to education.  Therefore, some type of linkage from school districts to 
local governments is necessary for investigating effects of state education aid on 
intergovernmental revenues earmarked for and spending on non-education programs.   
                                                 
7 This is true for independent school districts, which comprise about 90 percent of the districts in the United States.  
Dependent school districts do not collect revenue themselves and instead rely on local parent governments for their 
financial support.  Our county-area aggregation approach allows consistent treatment of both types of districts.   15 
The mapping of school districts to other local governments varies both across and within 
states:  school districts may share full or partial boundaries with counties or municipalities.   
Some school districts contain multiple municipalities, and some cities contain multiple school 
districts.  Additionally, the degree to which different types of local governments (for example, 
counties versus cities) take responsibility for non-education expenditures differs by state.  For 
these reasons, we use the Census of Government’s county-area unit of observation, which 
aggregates up revenues and expenditures for all governments within a given county.  This 
typically includes the county government itself,
8 all municipal and/or township governments 
located within the county, all school districts in the county, and any special districts in the 
county.
9  This unit of observation suits our needs by both linking school district finances to 
geographically coterminous other local government finances, and providing a unit of observation 
that is consistent across states despite state-level variation in the responsibilities of different 
levels of local governments. 
The drawback of this aggregation approach is that we do not capture changes in the 
distribution of state aid within county areas.  Most states have multiple school districts in a given 
county, so our approach captures only part of the redistribution induced by the SFE (i.e., if one 
school district in a county benefits from SFE while another suffers, we only observe the net 
effect at the county level).  As we show below, even at this aggregated level we find strong 
effects of SFEs on the distribution of state education aid.  For our purposes, this drawback of 
                                                 
8 Connecticut and Rhode Island do not have county governments recognized by the Census of Governments.  
Because their non-county local government finances can still be aggregated up to the county level, they are included 
in our data.   
9 Special districts are districts formed for special purposes, independent of other local governments.  The most 
common functions of special districts relate to natural resource management, fire protection, water supply, housing 
and community development, and sewerage.   16 
aggregation is clearly outweighed by the advantage of a consistent way to link changes in each 
area’s education resources to changes in its other resources. 
 
County-area Revenue and Expenditure Data  
Information on state and local revenues and expenditures is available from the Census of 
Government Finances, collected by the Bureau of the Census.  The Census is collected every 5 
years, in years ending in 2 and 7, and represents most governmental units.  We use, at different 
points, both the state and county-area files.  All county-area revenue and expenditure dependent 
variables are expressed in per capita terms in thousands of real 2000 dollars, and are summarized 
in Table 1.
10  Our approach compares county-area budgets over time, so we control for county-
area fixed effects as well as time-varying county-area demographics and economic conditions.
11   
  We analyze primarily major revenue and expenditure categories, and for consistency we 
construct total revenue and direct expenditure by aggregating up spending and revenues from 
these categories.
12  The totals presented here are therefore smaller than actual totals reported in 
the Census of Governments data and education spending as a share of our total spending measure 
is a larger ratio than education spending as a share of the reported Census of Governments total.  
Our totals are, however, consistently constructed over time to contain the largest sources of 
revenues and expenditures.  Real county-area revenues per capita in our sample grew from 
$1565 on average in 1982 to $2272 in 1997.  Mean real per capita direct expenditures (excluding 
intergovernmental expenditures) grew from $1345 in 1982 to $1919 in 1997.  Most localities, 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately these data are notoriously noisy.  We conservatively trim obvious miscodings (including, for 
example, an isolated jump in spending by a factor of 100 in one year), but results are not sensitive to this procedure.    
11 We do not currently model these demographics as endogenous to school finance reform, though some empirical 
evidence suggests that SFEs impact residential location decisions (see Aronson, 1999).  Results excluding these 
demographics as controls are quite similar. 
12 Reporting of totals and netting out of intra-county-area transfers changed substantially between the 1980s and the 
1990s, so we focus primarily on direct expenditures, which were reported consistently and comprise the bulk of all 
expenditures.   17 
unlike the federal government, have limited ability to run deficits so it is not surprising that 
revenues exceed expenditures on average.  In 1997, elementary and secondary education 
expenditures comprised over 60 percent of our measure of total direct spending by local 
governments.  Other major categories of expenditures include hospitals, highways, police, and 
welfare.  County-areas received just over 40 percent of their revenues as intergovernmental 
grants from the state, with three-quarters of those earmarked for education – so changes to this 
funding stream are likely to have a substantial impact on other aspects of state and local budgets. 
 
Classification of School Finance Equalizations 
  Table 2 lists the states and years, through 1997, in which state supreme courts ruled 
school financing systems unconstitutional and mandated reforms to the systems (following Card 
and Payne, and Corcoran et al).
13  It reveals considerable useful variation in the timing of school 
finance equalizations:  from 1982 to 1997, 14 states received court orders to reform their school 
finance systems.
14  From the data in our Table 2, we create a dichotomous SFE variable 
indicating if the state has had its school finance regime ruled unconstitutional in the past or in 
that year.
15   
 
Covariates 
  We control for county-level population, employment/population ratio, relative family 
income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban in all specifications. 
We obtain these variables from the Area Resource File and the Census Bureau.    
                                                 
13 For lists of cases in which state supreme courts upheld school finance systems or in which reform was 
legislatively rather than judicially induced, see Card and Payne, Table 1.   
14 Before 1982, eight states had SFEs.  Five of the states already under court order in 1982 experienced new court 
rulings requiring SFE between 1982 and 1997. 
15 The SFE variable turns from 0 to 1 when such a ruling occurs, and then stays at 1.   18 
  We interact state education aid, the variable of interest, with a number of demographic 
and institutional variables when exploring the heterogeneity of local responses to state aid.  The 
demographic variables are county level home-ownership, poverty rate, and black population 
share.  For each of these variables, we calculate the median at the state level in 1982 (weighted 
by population).  We then create dummy variables equal to one if the county has a higher 
population share (of homeowners, the poor, or blacks) than the state.  These demographic 
variables are from the Area Resource File. 
  We also estimate the interaction of changes in state aid with three variables that capture 
the institutional environment in each state:  the presence of tax or expenditure limits in the state 
(from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations), the ratio of local revenue 
collected in the state to revenue collected by the state itself (from the Census of Governments), 
and the presence of any dependent school districts in the county (from the Common Core of 
Data).   Each variable is coded as a dummy based on the value in 1982, the beginning of our 
sample.
16  
   
 V. RESULTS 
  We set out now to answer three questions:  First, how do school finance equalizations 
change state spending and revenue?  Second, how do they change the progressivity of state 
spending, not only on education but on all other programs?  Third, how do these changes in state 
spending affect localities’ revenues from other sources and expenditures on other programs?   
 
                                                 
16 We use the ratio of local revenue collected in the state in 1982 to state revenue collected in 1982 to construct a 
dummy variable equal to one if the county was in a state with a higher ratio of local to state revenue than the 
population-weighted national average.   19 
The Effect of SFEs on State Spending and Revenues 
We present results on aggregate state responses to school finance equalizations, from the 
estimation of equation (1), in Table 3.  Estimating the regression at the state level with only four 
years of data unsurprisingly yields mainly imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant 
results.  We estimate insignificant but positive effects of SFE on elementary-secondary spending 
(both total and intergovernmental) and spending on all intergovernmental grants.  The estimation 
also yields positive and insignificant point estimates on total revenue and two of its major 
components, sales tax revenue and revenue from charges, although the estimated effect on 
income tax revenue is negative (again, insignificantly so).  These results are generally consistent 
with those of Murray, Evans, and Schwab, who find that school finance equalizations typically 
are not self-financing, and that states finance them through increased revenue collection rather 
than through cuts in other programs.  It is also worth noting that the increases in state spending 
come not just through education spending (which is primarily intergovernmental), but also 
perhaps through public welfare spending – although none of these is significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
This state-level data also gives us an opportunity to explore the predictability of SFEs.   
Are certain states more likely to be under court order to increase (the equity of) their school 
spending?  We estimate equation (2) to gauge the exogeneity of the timing of court-ordered 
SFEs.  The adjusted R
2
 from this regression is 0.037, corroborating the findings of previous 
research that the presence of SFEs is largely unpredictable.  Results from a Probit, rather than 
this linear probability model, predict the presence of SFEs equally badly, with a pseudo-R
2 of 
0.058. 
   20 
The Progressivity of State Education and Non-Education Grants 
Table 4 shows the results from estimation of equation (3).  Court-ordered SFEs do serve 
to redistribute education revenue from the state towards poorer counties, as evidenced by the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the SFE*relative family income term.  The 
positive and significant coefficient on the SFE term reveals that equalizations also increase the 
average level of state education aid to local districts.  SFEs prompt much more minor, though 
also statistically significant, increases in the progressivity of state intergovernmental revenue to 
localities outside of education; they also lower the average amount of such aid.  On net, SFEs 
increase the level of state aid to localities overall (for education and other programs combined), 
and do so progressively.   
 
Level and Distribution of Local Spending and Revenues 
  We next examine the effect of changes in state education spending on local revenues 
(including revenues to localities from the state for education, other revenues from the state, and 
locally-raised revenues) and expenditures (including education and non-education spending).   
We begin by estimating equation (4) via OLS.  These results are shown in Table 5: these (naïve) 
regressions suggest that every dollar of state intergovernmental expenditure on education results 
in an offsetting reduction in total local revenue-raising of about 41 cents.  Almost the entire net 
increase in revenues the locality sees (64 cents) goes straight to education spending, which 
increases by 53 cents.  Spending on several other categories does not change statistically 
significantly; in those categories for which it does, the magnitude of the changes are extremely 
small (always less than a two-cent increase or decrease in spending in response to a one-dollar 
increase in education revenue).    21 
Because state and local spending decisions are based on local economic conditions, 
demographics, and preferences, the OLS results may not capture the causal relationship we 
would like to identify.  We use the presence of court-ordered school finance equalization 
measures, as described above, to capture exogenous changes in the revenues localities receive 
from the state for education.  We next estimate equation (4) using the presence of school finance 
equalizations to instrument for state intergovernmental spending on education.
17  Table 6 shows 
the results of the separate second-stage estimation of the average effect of SFE-driven state 
education spending on different local budget categories. As these estimates show, there is no 
statistically significant net effect of SFE-induced state education aid on total county-area 
revenue, as increases in education aid are canceled out by both state intergovernmental aid for 
non-education programs and own-source revenue declines.  For each dollar of state education 
aid, total state aid to localities rises by only $0.78 (different from 1 with p=.007).  The estimates 
of the effect on other state intergovernmental aid categories show that reductions in state aid to 
localities for highways, welfare, and health and hospitals explain nearly all of the $0.22 crowd-
out of other state funds.  At the mean, the implied elasticity of total state grants with respect to 
changes in state education grants is more than .5.  As we would expect, there is no corresponding 
reduction in federal intergovernmental revenues to localities.  The other main change crowding 
out the increase in state education aid is a decline in locally-generated revenue of $0.29, although 
this is not statistically significant.
18   
                                                 
17 The first column of Table 4 shows the first stage estimate of the effect of SFEs on state education grants to 
localities.  An alternate approach would be to use propensity score matching to match observations with SFEs to 
those without, and then use this score to estimate the average treatment effect of an SFE on state education grants.  
This estimate yields very similar results – a point estimate of .065 (standard error .006). 
18 This includes taxes (such as income, property, and sales taxes) and charges (such as hospital charges, tuition 
charges (primarily for higher education), sewerage, and highway and transportation charges).   There is some 
heterogeneity between states in how revenues are labeled.   22 
On the expenditure side, we see that while education expenditures go up (with a 
coefficient of $0.86 that is significantly different from zero and not from one), expenditures on 
several other categories go down – in particular hospitals, highways, health and public welfare.
19  
In fact, these decline by so much that there is no significant net effect of the state education aid 
on total direct expenditures.  
Table 7 tests the robustness of these results to alternate specifications.  First, we might be 
concerned that spending and revenue trends over time could be quite different for poor counties 
and rich counties.  We include time dummies interacted with an indicator for counties that are 
poorer than the median county in their state in the initial period to test for this possibility.  (Note 
that IV results omitting both this and all other covariates (Wald estimator) are virtually 
identical.)  Second, we show the GLS random effects estimates rather than the fixed effects 
estimator.
20  Third, we show the propensity score matching estimator.
21  While some of these 
estimates are imprecise, in each case the results are quite consistent.   
 
Heterogeneity of State Responses 
  Next, we consider several different potential sources of heterogeneity of local responses. 
While Table 6 shows us the effect of SFE-driven state education spending on the average 
locality, Table 8 presents estimates of equation (6), where both the SFE instrument and the 
(endogenous) state spending on education are interacted with the relative family income 
measure.  As these estimates show, higher-income localities see a greater crowding out of other 
state revenue for each dollar they might get of state education aid.  For example, a county with 
                                                 
19 There may be bureaucratic constraints on localities' ability to transfer funds between programs, since different 
legislative and political entities often control spending on schools versus other programs within the county area. 
(See, for example, the substantial literature on the "flypaper effect" and "Leviathan" government.) 
20 The county-area jurisdictions we analyze are the population of counties in the US, not a sample, and are fixed 
over time, so the fixed effects estimator is likely preferable. 
21 We match observations based on the same set of covariates, and include the propensity and propensity
2 in the 
second stage estimation.   23 
income one standard deviation above the state average would see other state aid reduced by 46 
cents for each dollar of education aid, while a county at the mean would see only a 34 cent 
reduction – this pattern thus reinforces the progressivity of changes in education spending.  On 
the expenditure side, higher-income (higher spending) counties are more likely to cut back on 
some other program expenditures as their education revenues (and expenditures) rise.  This is 
true and statistically significant for direct spending overall; while the effects on many of the 
individual expenditure categories are not statistically significant, the coefficients are 
systematically negative.  School finance equalizations and the changes in state spending they 
create thus have distributional implications not only for average spending across different budget 
categories, but also on the mix of revenues and expenditures used by localities with different 
income.   These results are also consistent with Hoxby’s finding that SFEs have differential 
effects on localities with different incomes. 
  In Table 8 we also show the results of equation (7), which allows the effect of income to 
be continuous but asymmetric, to see if income affects the responses of richer counties 
differently from the way it affects poorer counties.
22  We report the probability that income 
differentially affects the responses of counties above and below the median income for their state 
in 1982 (or that δ2 = δ3 from equation (7)).  It appears that high income counties see a greater 
offsetting reduction in both total expenditures and total revenues as their income rises (the first 
column in each panel).  The offsetting reduction in revenues seems to come, again, primarily 
from reductions in own-source local revenue.  There seem to be greater reductions in several 
                                                 
22 Gamkhar and Oates look for asymmetries in state local responses to changes in federal grants, but find similar 
responses to increases and decreases in grants.   24 
expenditure categories, although the standard errors are too large in most cases to conclude that 
responses are asymmetric.
23 
  Table 9 shows the results of regressions with six different interaction terms checking for 
heterogeneity of response by demographic and institutional characteristics.  For each type of 
characteristic, we present results from four separate regressions (dependent variables label the 
columns).  We begin by allowing local responses to state education aid to vary based on the 
presence of local tax or expenditure limits in the state.  Consistent with previous analyses of 
California’s reaction to Proposition 13, states with tax and expenditure limits in place in 1982 see 
significantly more local off-setting of state increases in education spending (resulting in smaller 
increases in total education spending).  We do not detect a statistically significant differential 
effect on locally-raised revenue, but the coefficient is negative and similar in magnitude to that 
predicting total intergovernmental revenue from the state, consistent with local and state revenue 
serving as substitutes for one another.   
  Second, we consider the effect of above-average home-ownership rates.  Responses to 
state education aid are not significantly different when home-ownership rates are higher, and for 
most budget categories the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term is relatively close 
to zero.  Third, in the far right top panel of Table 9, we present results showing how responses to 
state education aid vary in states where local revenue is more important (relative to state 
revenue).
24  County-areas in states with more local control get a significantly greater boost to 
total state intergovernmental revenue from state education aid.  These results are consistent with 
the idea that states that have a smaller role in revenue-raising do less off-setting of mandated 
                                                 
23 There may be even more income heterogeneity, but unfortunately, data do not allow a finer degree of 
decomposition (for example, into income quartiles). 
24 Again, we define this variable in 1982, so changes in state versus local revenue collection attributable to our 
identifying variation in SFEs between 1982 to 1997 are not incorporated in this “more local control” variable.     25 
increases in education spending.  (Clearly, states with more local control by this definition may 
differ along other dimensions that affect spending as well (such as voter preferences).  These 
results should thus be interpreted as descriptive rather than causal.)  
In the bottom panel of Table 9, we next show results on heterogeneity of response by 
whether counties have higher poverty rates than the state average (again, in 1982).  These results 
are consistent with the results by income in Table 8, which showed higher income counties 
experience more offsetting results from other state aid and total spending; here we see that 
counties with higher poverty rates experience less offsetting along these dimensions.  Fifth, we 
examine the differential impact of state education aid on county-level revenues and expenditures 
for counties with and without dependent school districts.  The only significant response we see 
here is for total expenditures, which is consistent with the fiscal dependence of these districts 
facilitating the process of their parent governments moving state aid earmarked for schools into 
other budget categories.  Last, we examine the role that the racial composition of the county-
areas plays in its response to changes in state education aid.  None of these coefficients is 
significantly different from zero.  Overall, while these interactions provide some intriguing hints 
about the underlying process governing local responses to changes in state education spending, 
none seems decisive in driving the heterogeneity of state responses. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
School finance equalizations are increasingly being used as a policy tool to improve 
outcomes for poor children.  The existing literature shows that these equalizations have had at 
least some success in redistributing state education dollars towards children in school districts 
with lower property wealth, but how redistributive these programs are and how they ultimately   26 
affect child outcomes depend critically on any resulting changes in other public expenditure 
programs.  While it is difficult to design systems that prevent any local “undoing” of 
redistribution from higher-level jurisdictions (or “undoing” of net redistribution by those higher-
level jurisdictions themselves), understanding the magnitude and impact of such responses 
should inform policy design.   Changes in state intergovernmental spending on education provide 
valuable insight into these spillovers – both because of the prominence of direct and 
intergovernmental education spending in state and local budgets and because of the policy 
experiments that mandated changes in the level and distribution of state spending. 
We find that states did change their spending patterns in a way that partially offset the 
mandated increase in their education spending (although not in a way that diminished their 
progressivity).  Each dollar of increased education funding a locality received from the state 
resulted in an average decline in funds from the state for other purposes of about 20 cents.  
Localities, in turn, reacted to the increased state revenue-raising and spending by cutting back on 
their own revenue-raising and their spending on both education and other programs.  The 
greatest impacts were on hospitals, highways, and welfare, but there were also significant 
declines in spending on police, public health, fire protection, and public buildings.  Thus, while 
mandated increases in state education aid did increase total spending on education, they did so at 
the expense of drawing resources away from spending on other programs.  These effects were 
greater in higher-income counties. 
Researchers need to incorporate the effect of these offsetting responses when they 
analyze the effects of mandated education spending changes on student outcomes, such as 
achievement test scores, high school dropout rates, and college attendance.  Changes in these 
outcomes reflect not only the changes in education spending but also changes in other resources   27 
which are inputs into those same student outcomes.  If, for example, high school dropout rates 
are unchanged with increased spending from school finance equalizations, a naïve interpretation 
would suggest that “money doesn’t matter” for education.  If, in fact, students are simultaneously 
experiencing a decline in programs such as community policing, summer camps, and vaccination 
campaigns, both educational resources and other resources could have mattered for student 
outcomes very much indeed. 
More broadly, these results have strong implications for redistribution policy in a federal 
system – both across programs and between localities.  The effectiveness of redistribution 
through specific programs is limited by the ability of intervening levels of government to undo 
that redistribution and to redirect funds for other purposes.  State governments may change both 
the composition of funding that each locality receives and the division of resources between 
localities in response to mandated changes in spending on certain programs or to certain 
jurisdictions.  Local jurisdictions, in turn, may also change the level and composition of their 
own spending.  Policy-makers must decide whether their goal is to change the level, distribution, 
or composition of public spending, and then anticipate the potentially off-setting reactions of 
intervening levels of government. 
These findings also prompt many new questions – both for education policy and for 
public spending more generally.  While we have shown that school finance equalizations on 
average have important spillover effects on other revenues and expenditures, the details of those 
equalizations, the policy environments in which they occur (such as under different school 
accountability measures or property tax limits), and how states raise revenue likely matter 
significantly in determining the nature of state and local responses.
25  Furthermore, while we 
                                                 
25 In future work, we will characterize school finance regimes by relevant parameters of their foundation or 
guaranteed tax revenue plans, as appropriate, to better identify changes in lump-sum grants and changes in tax prices   28 
have documented particular spillovers that result from policies aimed at redistribution through 
narrow programs, there are several other potential channels through which spillovers may occur.  
First, future work will couple analysis of the progressivity of state education spending with a 
parallel analysis of the progressivity of state and local raising-revenue – since changes in revenue 
patterns may change the net distribution of resources across residents of different localities.   
Second, changes in state education financing schemes or other changes to how local public 
goods are financed may affect local residential sorting and property values.  Incorporating these 
broader spillover effects will further refine our understanding of the effectiveness not only of 
school finance equalization measures but of targeted redistribution policy in a federal system.   
                                                                                                                                                             
facing local governments.  Again, changes in those parameters induced by court rulings can identify shifts in local 
responses that are not correlated with changes in state-level preferences for redistribution or education spending.   29 
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Table A.1 
Constitutional language and court rulings of unconstitutional school finance systems, 
through 1997 
 
Panel 1:  States with court-ordered school finance equalizations through 1997 




Low Medium  High 
Low  AL, AR, CA, CT, 
KS, KY, MA, MO, 
NH, TN, VT 
WI NC 
Medium  NJ, OH, RI, WV  AZ, TX, WY   
High   WA  MT 
 
Panel 2:  States without court-ordered school finance equalizations through 1997 




Low Medium  High 
Low  DE, IA, ME, MI, 
MS, NE, NY, OK, 
SC, UT 
IN, ND, NV, OR   
Medium  GA, MD, PA  CO, FL, ID, MN, 
SD 
NM 
High IL,  VA    LA 
 
Sources:  Card and Payne (2002), Corcoran et al (2003), and Figlio et al (2004). Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Revenues ($thous per cap)
Total 1.57 0.63 1.85 0.74 2.03 0.79 2.27 0.93
Federal Intergov. 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08
State Intergov. 0.65 0.29 0.76 0.33 0.86 0.36 0.96 0.39
    State Intergov - Education 0.46 0.19 0.55 0.23 0.63 0.26 0.72 0.25
    State Intergov - Highways 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.11
    State Intergov - Pub Welfare 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.07
    State Intergov - Hlth & Hosp 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Own Sources 1.10 0.67 1.29 0.84 1.30 0.81 1.44 0.92
Expenditures ($thous per cap)
Total - Direct 1.36 0.52 1.63 0.62 1.77 0.68 1.93 0.72
    Education 0.84 0.30 1.00 0.35 1.10 0.38 1.21 0.39
    Public Welfare 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11
    Hospitals 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.18 0.35
    Health 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08
    Highways 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.16
    Police 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.06
    Fire Protection 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
    Public Buildings 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Demographics
Median Family Income (thous) 3.46 0.77 3.76 0.96 3.81 0.93 4.05 0.95
Employment/Population 0.43 0.14 0.46 0.12 0.48 0.14 0.52 0.15
Pct Black 8.46 14.30 8.45 14.25 8.51 14.23 8.68 14.35
Pct Hispanic 3.88 10.33 4.22 10.76 4.78 11.21 5.65 11.66
Pct Poor 12.52 6.54 12.84 6.83 12.30 6.56 11.18 5.93
Pct Urban 35.50 28.81 35.58 29.03 36.52 29.11 38.67 29.69




Table 1:  Summary Statistics
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and Area Resource File, various years.
1982 1987 1992
All revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of per capita, real year 2000 dollars.  Totals 
are calculated as the sum of observed components.
32State            Year(s) of Ruling(s)
Alabama          1993, 1997                              
Arizona          1994, 1997                               
Arkansas         1983
California       1971, 1977                              
Connecticut     1977, 1996                              
Kansas           1976
Kentucky         1989
Massachusetts    1993
Missouri         1996
Montana          1989
New Hampshire    1993, 1997                                      
New Jersey       1973, 1976, 1990, 1994, 1997            
North Carolina   1997
Ohio             1997
Rhode Island     1994
Tennessee         1993, 1995                            
Texas            1989, 1991                              
Vermont          1997
Washington       1978, 1991                              
West Virginia    1979, 1988                              
Wisconsin        1976
Wyoming 1980, 1995                                    
Table 2:  Court Rulings of Unconstitutional School 
Finance Systems (through 1997)
Sources:  Card and Payne (2002), Corcoran et al. (2003), and Hoxby 
(2000).  Corcoran et al. cite Minorini and Sugarman (1999).  
Note that there is disagreement among these three sources in several cases.  
We generally follow Card and Payne for rulings through 1992, using 
Corcoran et al. for rulings post-1992.  Two exceptions are:  Card and Payne 
list New Jersey rulings in 1989 and 1991; we follow Corcoran et al. in listing 
Abbott v. Burke II in 1990 (see Abbott v. Burke II, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 
359 (1990)).  Card and Payne list a West Virginia ruling in 1978, but we 
follow Corcoran et al. in listing Pauley v. Kelley (I) in 1979 (see Pauley v. 
Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 SE.2d 859 (1979)).  
33Income Sales
tax rev tax rev
SFE dummy 0.077 0.026 0.022 0.021 0.282 0.031 -0.014 0.014 0.020
(.046) (.025) (.014) (.013) (.013) (.078) (.020) (.011) (.037)
State-year obs 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784
State obs 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
R-squared 0.75 0.47 0.75 0.89 0.38 0.84 0.39 0.61 0.13
Notes:  
Data represent annual state-level observations from 1982-97.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Rev from 
charges
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments (state files), various years.
All revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of per capita, real year 2000 dollars.  All regressions are OLS and 
control for state and year fixed effects, and state demographics (population, mean personal income, and percent poor).  












340.051 0.012 -0.012 -0.018 0.039 -0.007
(.005) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.008)
-0.028 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.044 -0.034
(.009) (.009) (.007) (.007) (.011) (.011)
-0.051 -0.009 -0.059
(.005) (.004) (.006)
12124 12124 12123 12123 12150 12150
0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87
Notes: Data represent annual county-area observations from 1982, 87, 92, and 97.  SEs in parentheses.




All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, 
employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and 
percent urban). 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and Area Resource File, various years.
SFE
Relative median family income
SFE*Relative median family income





Total State Revenue to 
Localities
350.637 0.006 1.044 0.044 0.013 0.007 0.000 -0.409
(.028) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.035)
Observations 12135 11593 12133 12133 12009 11862 11807 11753
0.533 0.532 0.018 -0.01 0.016 0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002
(.023) (.013) (.004) (.014) (.003) (.007) (.002) (.001) (.004)
Observations 12135 12135 11734 11977 11882 12110 12124 11992 11938
Notes: Data represent annual county-area observations from 1982, 87, 92, and 97.  SEs in parentheses.
All revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of per capita, real year 2000 dollars. 
Sources:
State IG Education 
Revenues to County
State IG Education 
Revenues to County
All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, 
employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and 
percent urban). 




















Exp on Pub 
Bldgs
















Pub Welf  
IG Rev 
from State
360.295 -0.035 0.779 -0.221 -0.080 -0.071 -0.043 -0.294
(.250) (.045) (.080) (.080) (.041) (.022) (.018) (.313)
Observations 12135 11593 12133 12133 12009 11862 11807 11753
-0.288 0.860 -0.069 -0.486 -0.097 -0.288 -0.042 -0.045 -0.055
(.220) (.119) (.038) (.136) (.033) (.070) (.020) (.012) (.037)
Observations 12135 12135 11734 11977 11882 12110 12124 11992 11938
Notes: Data represent annual county-area observations from 1982, 87, 92, and 97.  SEs in parentheses.
All revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of per capita, real year 2000 dollars. 
Sources:













Instrument is Presence of Court-Ordered School Finance Equalization
Revenue from 
Own Sources
State IG Education 
Revenues to County
All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, 
employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent 
urban). 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and Area Resource File, various years.












State IG Education 
Revenues to County













370.779 0.807 -0.294 -0.305 -0.288 -0.25 0.860 0.839 0.813 0.055 0.175 0.899 1.035 -0.399 0.518 0.518
(.080) 0.076 (.313) (.300) (.220) (.209) (.119) (.113) (.069) (.262) (.183) (.101) (.090) (.036) (.023) (.013)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No
Notes: Data represent annual county-area observations from 1982, 87, 92, and 97.  SEs in parentheses.













Table 7:  Alternative Specifications 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and Area Resource File, various years.
IV  regressions in first two panels control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, employment/population ratio, median family 
income, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban).  IV is presence of court-ordered school finance equalization.  
Propensity score matching in third panel is performed using covariates listed above, and the propensity score and propensity score squared are included in second stage 
regressions.
















Interacted with "Poor 
County in Initial Period" 
Dummy




IG Education Revenues 
from State to County
380.221 0.507 -0.059 -0.072 0.662 0.73 -0.338 -0.270 -0.119 -0.107 -0.098 -0.081 -0.055 -0.042 -0.163 0.328
(.331) (.321) (.059) (.058) (.107) (.103) (.107) (.103) (.054) (.052) (.030) (.029) (.023) (.023) (.416) (.408)
-0.079 -0.026 -0.123 -0.123 -0.042 -0.028 -0.013 0.139
(.109) (.020) (.035) (.035) (.018) (.010) (.008) (.138)
0.093 -0.033 -0.082 -0.082 -0.035 -0.018 -0.006 0.434
(.106) (.019) (.034) (.034) (.017) (.009) (.008) (.136)
-0.867 0.007 -0.310 -0.310 -0.075 -0.074 -0.046 -1.165
(.417) (.072) (.134) (.134) (.066) (.037) (.029) (.520)
Prob. Low = High 0.029 0.596 0.106 0.106 0.564 0.143 0.194 0.004
Observations
-0.513 -0.276 0.932 0.965 -0.101 -0.069 -0.571 -0.454 -0.121 -0.102 -0.39 -0.386 -0.045 -0.039 -0.054 -0.055 -0.074 -0.075
(.292) (.281) (.157) (.152) (.049) (.049) (.179) (.174) (.043) (.042) (.093) (.090) (.026) (.025) (.016) (.016) (.049) (.047)
-0.24 0.077 -0.035 -0.092 -0.026 -0.108 -0.003 -0.010 -0.020
(.096) (.052) (.016) (.059) (.014) (.031) (.009) (.005) (.016)
-0.097 0.097 -0.017 -0.021 -0.015 -0.106 0.000 -0.010 -0.021
(.093) (.050) (.016) (.058) (.014) (.030) (.008) (.005) (.015)
-0.892 -0.012 -0.11 -0.414 -0.076 -0.119 -0.019 -0.008 -0.018
(.365) (.198) (.054) (.226) (.051) (.116) (.033) (.020) (.060)
Prob. Low = High 0.039 0.604 0.107 0.101 0.263 0.915 0.578 0.918 0.958
Observations
Notes: Data represent annual county-area observations from 1982, 87, 92, and 97.  SEs in parentheses.
All revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of per capita, real year 2000 dollars. 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and Area Resource File, various years.
State IG Education 
Revenues to County
Expenditures
Table 8:  Heterogeneity of Responses Based on Income
Revenues
Instruments are Presence of Court-Ordered School Finance Equalization and Interaction with Relative Income
Revenue from 
Own Sources
Hlth/Hosp IG Rev 
from State
All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, employment/population ratio, median family income, percent black, percent Hispanic, 
percent poor, and percent urban). 
State IG Ed Rev * 
Relative Income
State IG Ed Rev * 
Relative Inc for Low 
Income Counties
State IG Ed Rev * 
Relative Inc for High 
Income Counties
Total Revenue
State IG Education 
Revenues to County
State IG Ed Rev * 
Relative Income
State IG Ed Rev * 
Relative Inc for Low 
Income Counties
State IG Ed Rev * 
Relative Inc for High 
Income Counties
IG Rev from Fed
Exp on Educ
IG Rev from State Non-Ed IG Rev from 
State
Highway IG Rev 
from State
Pub Welf  IG Rev 
from State
Exp on Police Exp on Fire Prot Exp on Pub Bldgs Total Direct 
Expenditure
Exp on Pub Welf Exp on Hosps Exp on Health Exp on Highways
39Interaction:
0.476 -0.094 -0.411 1.160 0.715 -0.295 -0.485 0.890 0.694 -0.296 -0.400 0.930
(.139) (.492) (.348) (.195) (.110) (.435) (.302) (.163) (.092) (.361) (.252) (.136)
Interaction Term 0.156 -0.103 0.063 -0.155 0.073 0.001 0.227 -0.034 0.114 0.002 0.151 -0.094
(.049) (.173) (.121) (.068) (.060) (.238) (.164) (.088) (.038) (.149) (.103) (.055)
Interaction:
0.664 -0.033 -0.527 0.932 0.776 -0.265 -0.321 0.832 0.788 -0.281 -0.274 0.856
(.109) (.423) (.298) (.160) (.080) (.314) (.221) (.118) (.078) (.307) (.215) (.116)
Interaction Term 0.168 -0.385 0.350 -0.106 0.016 -0.145 0.170 0.142 -0.053 -0.085 -0.079 0.025
(.056) (.220) (.154) (.083) (.055) (.218) (.151) (.081) (.047) (.187) (.129) (.069)
Notes: Data represent annual county-area observations from 1982, 87, 92, and 97.  SEs in parentheses.
All revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of per capita, real year 2000 dollars. 
Sources:
Interaction terms are all measured in the initial period and constant over time.  Home ownership (percent of population owning home) and local control (local revenues 
from own sources/state revenues from own sources) are dummy variables for values higher than the median in the initial period.
All regressions control for county-area and year fixed effects, and county-level demographics (population, employment/population ratio, median family income, percent 
black, percent Hispanic, percent poor, and percent urban). 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and Area Resource File, various years.
IG Educ Rev from 
State to County
Large Poor Population Dependent School Districts Large Black Population
Total IG Rev 
from State




Total IG Rev 
from State






Total IG Rev 
from State






Total IG Rev 
from State






Table 9:  Other Sources of Heterogeneity of Responses
Tax and Expenditure Limits High Home Ownership More Local Control
Education 
Expend




Total IG Rev 
from State






Total IG Rev 
from State
Rev from Own 
Sources
Total 
Expend
40